Dan Rodney Joos v. Piper C. Joos (Monte) : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2001
Dan Rodney Joos v. Piper C. Joos (Monte) : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald C. Barker; Attorney for Appellant.
Ephraim H. Fankhauser; Attorney for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Joos v. Joos (Monte), No. 20011005 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3605
IN THE UTAH COURT OIIIVPPEALS 
—000O000— 
DAN RODNEY JOOS, ) 
Petitioner and Appellant, ) BRIEJIPF APPELLANT 
vs. ) Caseiifo. 20011005-CA 
PIflER C. JOOS (MONTE), ) 
Thijdl 
Respondent and Appellee. ) Judge] 
jlstrict Court, 
yrone Medley 
-000O000-
APPEAL - APPELLANTIIIBRIEF 
E.}L Fankhauser, Esq., #1032 
Attorney for Appellee 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)534-1148 
FAX: (801)531-7928 
C Barker, #0208 
hr for Appellant 
)uth State Street 
ke City, Utah 84115-3692 
one: (801)486-9636 
(801)486-5754 
rcb@xmission.com 
CONTENTS 
c of Authorities ' ' 
-mem of Jurisdiction 1 
hsucb I'rcs^.i.v-J for Rev ie w . . .1-4 
( "oiislifiidiHi.il Pun 1'jrni',, Statutes 
statement of the Case ] 
Nature of the Case 
Course ol Pioceedinj^i . > 
Sh»1f"»' p|l n| I'liiiJ' . . . ., 
Summary of Arguments ™ 
Argument , , 
Conclusion Stating the Piecise Rcltd Sought . . . . • 
Addendum . 1> 
Utah Code Title 30 Divorce Laws 4f» (>J. 
/ 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Collins v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment, 
16 P.3d 1251 (Ut. Ct. App. 2000) 4 
Collins v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment, 453 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 
(August 8, 2002) 41 
Dodge v. Graville, 533 U.S.945; 121 S.Ct. 2584; 150 L.Ed2d 745 
(June 2001) 17, 42 
Englert v. Englert, 576P.2d 1274 (1978) 2,18,21,22,26,28 
Grand County v. Rogers, 44 P.3d 734 (March 2002) 4,38,42,43 
K.S. andK.S v. S.K and G.H., 45 P.3d 527 Ut. Ct. App. 2002 19 
Kapetanov v. Small Claims Court ofOgden, 659 P.2d 1049 (Utah 1983) 36,37 
Miller v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co 44 P.3d 663 (Utah 2002) 
Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119 37 
Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 19 P.3d 1005 (2001) 2,15,18,21,22,26 
28,37,40 
State ex relS.A. 37 P.3d 1166 (Ut. Ct. App. 2001) 18 
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed2d 49 (2000) passim 
RULES 
Rule 11 URCP 3,11,14,16,23,34 
35,38,39 
Rule 4-501 Rof JA 36 
/ / 
Rule 4-506 Rof JA 3,16,38 
STATUTES 
Judicial Code 78-2a-3(2)(h) 1 
Judicial Code 78-33 (Declaratory Judgments) 2,10,14,15, 
16,22,23,37 
Utah Code Title 30 (Divorce) passim 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Page 
United States Declaration of Independence 5,6,40 
U.S. Constitution Article IV, § 2 7 
U.S. Constitution Amendment I 3,7,14,17,22,34,40 
U.S. Constitution Amendment V 2,3,7,15,22,25,41 
U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV 2,3,7,14,15,23,25,28,29,41 
Utah Constitution Article I Sec. 1 3,8,14,17,22,23,25,40,41 
Utah Constitution Article I Sec. 2 3,8,22,23,28,29,41 
Utah Constitution Article I Sec. 3 8,22,25 
Utah Constitution Article I Sec. 7 2,3,8,22,41 
Utah Constitution Article I Sec. 11 8,22 
Utah Constitution Article IV Seel 2,9 
/ / / 
Utah Constitution Article VIII § 5 9,19 
Article 8 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 3,9 
Article 10 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 2,3,9 
Article 12 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 3,9 
Article 16 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 2,3,10 
Article 17 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 3,10 
IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over domestic relations pursuant to 
Judicial Code 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
II 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. In light of Troxel v. Granville,' whether forcing parents to litigate to 
obtain a divorce [or to modify a divorce], as required by Title 30 of the 
Utah Code, unconstitutionally burdens fit parents' federal constitutional 
right to raise their children without the interference from the judiciary. 
(Correction of Error Standard, giving no deference to the District Court)2. 
See Record ("R") P. 3-7, 185. Tr. July 30, 2001, P. 8, 10 &13 - Tr. 
October 15, 2001, P. 16-20 
B. Whether Utah's divorce laws are unconstitutional, void and unenforceable 
as applied in this case and/or on their face, under the standards set forth by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Troxel, supra (Correction of Error Standard, 
1
 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.CT. 2054,147 L.Ed2d 49 (2000). 
2
 Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah Ct. Ap. 1994). 
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giving no deference to the District Court - Bingham, supra). R. 3-7; 85-
89, 135, 167-185. Tr. July 30, 2001, P. 9-11. 
C. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals unpublished decision of November 4, 
1999, in case/oas v. Joos, Case #990666CA, was over-ruled, along with 
the Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey 19 P.3D 1005 2001 and Englert v. Englert 
576 P.2d 1274 (1978) "no hint of limitation" interpretations as to the 
extent of a district court judges' power (Correction of Error Standard, 
giving no deference to the District Court - Bingham, supra). R. 3-7, 126, 
130-132. Tr. July 30, 2001, P. 9&10. 
D. Whether gender bias of the judiciary, as generally applied by domestic 
relations commissioners and judges, and as applied by Judge Medley in 
this case, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the 
Federal and Utah Constitutions, including Article IV, Section 1 of Utah's 
constitution and Articles 10 and 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. (Correction of Error Standard, giving no deference to the District 
Court -Bingham, supra). R. 128, 130, 131, 134, 187-191, 194,226-228. 
Tr. July 30, 2001, P. 4 - Tr. October 15, 2001, P. 4-8. 
E. Whether dismissal of declaratory judgment under the circumstances 
violated the "any person" clause of UC 78-33-2, the "liberally construed 
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and administered" clause of UC 78-33-12, the redress clause of the Bill of 
Rights, sections 1, 2 and 7 of the Declaration of Rights of the Utah 
constitution and/or Articles 8, 10, 12, 16, and 17 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. (Correction of Error Standard, giving no 
deference to the District Court - Bingham, supra). R. 156, 157, 187-189. 
Tr. July 30, 2001, P. 4, 5. 
Whether Rule 11 monetary sanctions imposed by the district court violates 
URCP 11 (A) prohibition against sanctions for seeking "The establishment 
of new law" [(b)(2)] (Correction of Error Standard, giving no deference 
to the District Court -Bingham, supra). R.188,228. Tr. July 30,2001, P. 
15-17 - Tr. October 15, 2001, P.14. 
Whether the District Court lacked jurisdiction to impose Rule 11 sactions 
where the motion was filed in violation of the 20 day safe harbor and other 
procedural provisions of URCP 11 and/or Rule 4-506 (4) R.J. A. R. 159, 
189 & 227. (Correction of Error Standard, giving no deference to the 
District Court - Bingham, supra). 
Whether imposition of URCP 11 sanctions constitutes denial of due 
process to those seeking to change the law. (Correction of Error Standard, 
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giving no deference to the District Court - Bingham, supra). R. 187 & 
189. 
I. Whether the 11/4/99 [R. 22] and/or the 12/17/99 [R. 24] memorandum 
decisions by Utah Court of Appeals in connection with Dan's prior appeal 
in this case, which held without discussion of legal arguments, that the 
Utah Divorce Laws are constitutional, were in effect overruled by Troxel, 
supra, and (as discussed in | A, B and C in this §) whether because said 
Memorandum Decisions were overruled by Troxel supra, they no longer 
have res judicata effect on these proceedings.3 Those Memorandum 
Decisions also failed to give an analysis, reasoning, citations and 
authorities in a published decision regarding Dan's federal constitutional 
3
 In Collins v. Sandy City, 16 P.3d 1251, 1254, f 16-29 (Ut Ct. App. 2000), this 
court stated the rule in part as follows [R. 158]: 
f 16. .. .it is the general rule that a subsequent change in the operative facts 
or the controlling law has generally relieved a party from the application 
of res judicata. (Citations omitted). (Emphasis added). 
Tfl7. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Duel 324 U.S. 154, 
65 S.Ct. 573, 89 L.Ed. 812 (1945). the Supreme Court stated that "it is ... the 
general rule that res judicata is no defense where between the time of the 
first judgment and the second there has been an intervening decision or 
a change in the law creating an altered situation." Id. at 162, 65 S.Ct. at 
576. (Emphasis added). 
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right as a fit parent to raise children without interference of the state meet 
the standards as mandated by the Utah Supreme Court in Grand County 
v. Rogers, 44P.3d 734,f14-16, footnotes 3 & 4 (March 2002). Had such 
reasoning been given in said Memorandum Decisions, this Court would 
have held that Utah Divorce Law is unconstitutional. Grand County, 
supra, should be applied retroactively and this Court should reconsider its 
holdings therein that Utah Divorce Laws are constitutional. (Correction 
of Error Standard - Bingham, supra). [R. 158]. 
Ill 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, RULES. ETC, 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 
UNANIMOUSLY PASSED BY THE CONGRESS OF THE THIRTEEN 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
July 4, 1776 
When in the Course of human Events, it becomes necessary for one People to 
dissolve the Political Bands which have connected them with another, and to assume 
among the Powers of the Earth, the separate and equal Station to which the Laws of 
Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind 
requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the Separation. 
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness - That to secure these Rights, Governments are 
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instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that 
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the 
Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its 
Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall 
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that 
Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient Causes; and 
accordingly all Experience hath shewn, that Mankind are more disposed to suffer, while 
Evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the Forms to which they are 
accustomed. But when a long Train of Abuses and Usurpations, pursuing invariably 
the same Object, evinces a Design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is 
their Right, it is their Duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new 
Guards for their future Security. Such has been the patient Sufferance of these 
Colonies; and such is now the Necessity which constrains them to alter their former 
Systems of Government. The History of the present King of Great Britain is a History 
of repeated Injuries and Usurpations, all having in direct Object the Establishment of an 
absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid 
World.... 
In every stage of these Oppressions we have Petitioned for Redress in the most 
humble Terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated 
Injury. A Prince, whose Character is thus marked by every act which may define a 
Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free People.... 
We, therefore, the Representatives of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, in 
GENERAL CONGRESS, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the World 
for the Rectitude of our Intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People 
of these Colonies, solemnly Publish and Declare, That these United Colonies are, and 
of Right ought to be FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES; that they are absolved from 
all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political Connection between them and 
the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as FREE AND 
INDEPENDENT STATES, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract 
Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which 
INDEPENDENT STATES may of right do. And for the support of this Declaration, with 
a firm Reliance on the Protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each 
other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor, (Emphasis added) 
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CONSTITUTIONS 
U.S. Constitution Article IV § 2 [Supremacy] 
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof;....shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding. (Emphasis added). 
U.S. Constitution Amendment I [.... Petition of Grievances] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. (Emphasis added). 
U.S. Constitution Amendment V [.... Due Process of Law] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land 
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; 
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation. (Emphasis added). 
U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV, § 1 [.... Due Process and Equal Protection] 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. (Emphasis added). 
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Utah Constitution Article I Sec. 1 - [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
§ 1 - All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their 
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the 
dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, 
being responsible for the abuse of that right. (Emphasis added). 
Utah Constitution Article I Sec, 2 [All political power inherent in the people.] 
§ 2 - All political power is inherent in the people; and all free governments are 
founded on their authority for their equal protection and benefit, and they have the 
right to alter or reform their government as the public welfare may require. 
(Emphasis added). 
Utah Constitution Article I Sec. 3 [Federal Constitution supremacy]. 
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the Federal Union and the 
Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land. (Emphasis added). 
Utah Constitution Article I Sec. 7 [Due process of law]. 
§ 7 - No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. (Emphasis added). 
Utah Constitution Article I Sec. 11 [Courts open - Redress of injuries.] 
§ 11 - All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in 
his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself 
or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. (Emphasis added). 
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Utah Constitution Article IV Sec. 1 [Equal rights & privileges]. 
The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to vote and hold office shall not be 
denied or abridged on account of sex. Both male and female citizens of this State shall 
enjoy equally all civil, political and religious rights and privileges. (Emphasis added). 
Utah Constitution Article VIII §5 [Right of Appeal] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited 
by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district 
court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all 
other courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided by statute. Except for matters 
filed originally with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right 
from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the 
cause. (Emphasis added) 
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS [1948]4 
Article 8 
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national 
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution 
or by law. (Emphasis added) 
Article 10 
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and 
obligations and of any criminal charge against him. (Emphasis added) 
Article 12 
4 
Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948. U. S. has signature to 
this Declaration, [internet address: http://www.hri.org/DOCS/UDHR48.html. 
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No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home 
or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the 
right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 
Article 16 
1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality 
or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal 
rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution, (Emphasis added) 
2. Marriage shall be entered into with the free and full consent of the intending 
spouses. 
3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled 
to protection by society and the State. 
Article 17 
1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with 
others. 
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 
TITLE 30 - UTAH CODE 
Applicable Utah Divorce Laws Are in the Addendum. 
TITLE 78 - UTAH CODE 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 
Chapter 33 
78-33-1. Jurisdiction of district courts —Form —Effect. 
The district courts within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to 
declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could 
be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a 
declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative 
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or negative in form and effect; and such declaration shall have the force and effect of a 
final judgment or decree. (Emphasis added) 
78-33-2. Rights, status, legal relations under instruments or statutes may be determined. 
Any person interested under a deed, will or written contract, or whose rights, 
status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract 
or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising 
under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a 
declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. (Emphasis added) 
78-33-12. Chapter to be liberally construed. 
This chapter is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford relief 
from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations; 
and is to be liberally construed and administered. 
(Emphasis added) 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
URCP 11 
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other 
paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating), an 
attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, 
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by 
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law. (Emphasis added). 
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(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court 
determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the 
conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, 
or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation. 
(1) How initiated. 
(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately 
from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate 
subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with 
or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such 
other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, 
contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If 
warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable 
expenses and attorney fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. In appropriate 
circumstances, a law firm may be held jointly responsible for violations committed by 
its partners, members, and employees. (Emphasis added). 
(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order 
describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an 
attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with 
respect thereto. 
(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule 
shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable 
conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and 
(B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order 
to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective 
deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable 
attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation. 
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for 
a violation of subdivision (b)(2). (Emphasis added). 
-12-
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the 
court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the 
claims made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned. 
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct 
determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction 
imposed. 
RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
RULE 4-506. WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASES. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure and criteria for withdrawal of counsel in civil 
cases 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all counsel in civil proceedings in trial courts of record 
except guardians ad litem and court-appointed counsel. 
(4) If an attorney withdraws, dies, is suspended from the practice of law, is 
disbarred, or is removed from the case by the court, opposing counsel shall serve a 
Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel on the unrepresented client. The Notice to Appear 
or Appoint Counsel must inform the unrepresented client of the responsibility to appear 
in a court or appoint counsel. A copy of the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel must 
be filed with the court. No further proceedings shall be held in the case until 20 days 
have elapsed from filing of the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel unless the 
client of the withdrawing attorney waives the time requirement or unless otherwise 
ordered by the court, (emphasis added) 
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IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case 
This case challenges: 
(A) The constitutionality of Utah's divorce laws with respect to: 
(1) Power of the Court to interfere with the decisions of fit parents. 
(2) Gender discrimination against males. 
(3) Lack of equal protection to parents who divorce as compared with rights 
of other parents. 
B. The District Court's grant of monetary sanctions when forbidden by 
provisions of URCP Rule 11. 
C. The failure of the District Court to respect Dan's religious beliefs and other 
constitutional rights. 
D. The failure of the District Court to abide by the law and legislative intent re 
declaratory judgments. 
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Course of Proceedings 
The Utah Court of Appeals, on November 4,1999, determined in an unpublished 
decision in a related case, Joos v. Joos, Case #990666CA, that Utah's divorce laws are 
constitutional without allowing briefing or argument. [R. 22 & 23]. 
1. The United States Supreme Court determined on June 5,2000, that state laws 
that give state judges too much power over fit parents' constitutional right to raise and 
to make decisions regarding their children are unconstitutional. {Troxel v. Granville, 
120 S. CT. 2054). That court, in plurality opinion, determined that the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments' Due Process Clauses protect fit parents rights to be the 
decision-makers. [R.92-103]. 
2. The Utah Court of Appeals, on February 15, 2001, held that "by the plain 
language of the statute, divorce courts have jurisdiction over 'children'" and that the 
power of the judge to be the decision-maker over the children is absolute with "no hint 
of limitation" {Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey 19 P.3d 1005; 1007 and 1008). [R.62,131]. 
3. On March 5, 2001, appellant Dan Rodney Joos petitioned the Third District 
Court for a declaratory judgment seeking a declaration [R.l-34], among other things, 
that Utah Appellate decisions have, in effect: (1) been over-ruled by the Troxel 
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court; (2) that parents rights as the decision-makers are 
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protected by federal law and the constitution; and (3) that Utah's divorce laws are 
unconstitutional for failure to preserve and protect these fundamental constitutional 
rights. 
4. Judge Medley denied Dan's motion. [R.238-245]. At a hearing he imposed 
monetary sanctions against Dan under URCP 11 after ruling that Dan's petition lacked 
merit. Dan's Petition and this appeal seek, among other things, to reverse a long-
standing bias by the judiciary against males in domestic relations matters. Among other 
things, the District Court allowed or ordered: 
a. Improperly limited Dan's argument by directing that he not to refer to 
exhibits [R. 167-185] he had prepared for the hearing, that he not address 
the constitutional issues regarding Utah's divorce laws, etc. which he had 
detailed for the court. Instead Dan was, in effect, limited to responding 
to issues raised by the mother's attorney. [Tr. 7/30/2001, P. 14]. 
b. Failed to afford to Dan the safe harbor and other rights under of Rule 11 
URCP, Rule 4-506 CJA, etc. [R. 59-70, 189 & 190] 
c. Failed to apply the required remedial liberal construction directed in the 
declaratory judgment statute, UC 78-33-12. [R.188]. 
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d. May have, in effect, denied Dan's First Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution and Article one of the State Constitution rights of a litigant 
to seek redress from the Court. [R.67 & 68]. 
e. Appears to have followed the judiciary's customary and usual bias in 
favor of females in domestic relations matters. [R.128, 188-191]. 
6. Dan filed a Rule 59 URCP motion to alter or to amend judgment [R. 187-205], 
which was denied. [R.254-262]. 
This appeal followed. 
Statement of Facts 
In addition to the facts included under "Course of Proceedings" % 1-6 above, 
controlling facts include the following: 
1. In this case (Nov. 1999) the Utah Court of Appeals held that the Utah Divorce 
Laws are constitutional. [R.22,23]. 
2. Thereafter in (June, 2000), in Troxel, supra, a case involving grandparent 
visitation, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a State cannot constitutionally 
deprive fit parents of their right to make decisions concerning their children by 
giving that power to the State Judge. [R.92-103].In£>odgev. Graville, 121 S.Ct. 
2584 (June 2001) the U. S. Supreme Court vacated an Arizona Appellate Courts' 
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decision which, like the Utah Court of Appeals, had failed to consider Troxel, 
supra. It is apparent from Dodge, supra, that the U. S. Supreme Court has made 
it clear that it intends to compel all states to follow its mandate in Troxel supra, 
that the state courts not interfere with decisions by fit parents concerning their 
children. 
In Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 19 P.3d 1005 (Ct. App. 2001), a recent divorce case 
[R.62,131], the Court of Appeals ignored the intervening U. S. Supreme Court 
decision in Troxel, supra, and instead based its decision on the old Englert v. 
Englert, 576 P.2 1274 (Utah 1978), where the Court held that Judges have very 
broad powers concerning the children because the Divorce Statues give "no hint 
of limitation" on the Judge's powers. [R.131-132]. 
In State ex rel S.A, 37 P.3d 1166 at 14 (Ut. Ct. App. 2001), the Court of Appeals 
cited and quoted from Troxel, supra, in part as follows: 
"The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall 
'deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law,' citing Troxel, supra. The liberty interest at 
issue in this case-the interest of parents in the 
care, custody, and control of their children-is 
perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty 
interests recognized by this Court." (Citations 
omitted) There is no dispute that the parent-
child relationship is accorded constitutional 
protection/' (Emphasis added). 
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IntLS. andKX v. S. H. and G. H., 45 P.3d 527 at 115 (Ut Ct App. 2002), the 
Court of Appeals cited and quoted from Troxel, supra, in part as follows: 
"[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or 
her children...there will normally be no reason 
for the State to inject itself into the private realm 
of the family to further question the ability of 
that parent to make the best decisions 
concerning the rearing of that parent's 
children." (Emphasis added). 
An abuse of discretion standard is used to review a divorce judge's orders 
regarding children. Because the Court of Appeals has held that there is "no hint 
of limitation" on domestic relations judge's powers (discretion), when we apply 
the abuse of discretion standard for appeals, divorce litigants are, in effect, 
deprived of their right to a meaningful appeal as guaranteed by Utah Constitution 
Art. VIII, § 5. If there is unlimited discretion it would be hard to find a 
circumstance where exercise of that power would be an abuse of discretion. Utah 
Law, in effect, deprives domestic relations litigants of their right to a meaningful 
appeal Utah's divorce laws fail to protect constitutional parental rights of fit 
parents to make decisions concerning their children without court interference 
and to require the court to give weight to their decisions. Utah divorce laws are 
void, unconstitutional and unenforceable. 
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Related Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
7. Consolidation with Petition for Writ of Certiorari. A related Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari from a 5/31/02 Memorandum Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
in Joos v. Joos, Court of Appeal Case # 20020126-CA, is pending before the 
Utah Supreme Court as Case #20020580-SC. Both cases involve substantially 
the same issues of law, Challenges to the constitutionality of Utah's Divorce 
Laws, etc. Appellant requests that this Court transfer this case to the Utah 
Supreme Court for consolidation with that related matter under URAP 43. 
V 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Unlimited discretion given to Utah divorce Courts, together with the 
abuse of discretion standard for appeals, makes Utah's divorce laws 
unconstitutional. The abuse of discretion standard the Utah Court of Appeals uses to 
review decisions of divorce judges is inappropriate and insufficient to protect parents 
constitutional rights to raise their children. It seriously impairs or destroys father-child 
relationships. Abuse of discretion is the lowest standard of review, which cannot be 
used when constitutional liberties are at issue. If there are no limits to the trial Court's 
discretion then there are no standards by which we can measure possible abuse of that 
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power. Without standards or limits, it would be difficult to imagine a circumstance 
where the trial court could abuse its discretion. As a consequence, domestic relations 
litigants are, in effect, deprived of their constitutional right to a meaningful appeal 
Because the judiciary has failed to impose a striclri soiidm, sliiiiilifiil or meet the 
in mini 111 n 1111 s (;,i i II 1211" 11 of giving weight to fit parent's decisions concerning their children 
as required by Troxel, Utah's divorce laws are void, unconstitutional and unenforceable 
on their face (in some cases) and as applied (in all cases) when the parent-child 
relationship is at issue. 
2. Shinkoskey failed to consider Troxel The 2000 U. S. Supreme Court 
decision in Troxel supra, which mandates that decisions of fit parents concerning their 
children be given substantial weight, appears to have not been considered in the Utah 
Court of Appeal's 2001 Shinkoskey decision. Instead of following the 2000 Troxel 
supra decision, the Court of Appeals applied the 1978 Englert, supra decision, and 
continued to hold that there was "no hint of limitation" on the power of the divorce court 
and that an abuse of discretion standard applied on appeal In so doing and contrary to 
Troxel supra, this Court continues to fail to presume that a fit father acts in the best 
interest of his children. This Court did not find the father unfit, or to give weight to his 
decisions, or determine which parent was being unreasonable. Instead, as is customary, 
it assumed the role of decision maker, giving little or no weight to the decisions of fit 
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parents, as required by Troxel supra. Under the Troxel supra decision, it should have 
remanded the case for reconsideration by the trial court based upon the Troxel supra 
standards in an effort to bring about a non-adversarial resolution. Failure to apply the 
standards stated in Troxel supra, and the erroneous application of Englert, supra, 
combine to diminish this father in the eyes of his children and to destroy the very family 
bonds that this Court is supposed to be preserving. 
3. Giving the trial Court unlimited power & discretion is unconstitutional 
The divorce judge's power over the children with "no hint of limitation" interpretation 
of This Court in that case [19 P.3d 1008] means, at a minimum, that this Court believes 
the U.S. and State Constitutions are inferior to a state judge's discretion (power). The 
divorce judge has absolute power to discriminate, to dominate; to disparage religion, 
freedom, speech and liberty and is not bound by any Bill of Rights or Declaration of 
Rights. Certainly any law that does this is invalid and unconstitutional! 
4. Declaratory judgment is an appropriate procedure for resolving this 
dispute. One forum available to divorced parents to reclaim their rights, by a First 
Amendment petition for redress of grievances, is to file a declaratory judgment action. 
The Federal First Amendment is the most strictly enforced and protected of all American 
citizen rights and forbids courts from foreclosing forums except under the most 
demanding and strict scrutiny - especially when alternate forums are unavailable. The 
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trial Court erred when it not only declined to afford Dan a full hearing on his claim for 
Declaratory Judgment, but by punishing Dan for a URCP 11 violation for attempting to 
assert his rights. Fortunately, Utah's Constitution Article 1, § 1 and 2 declare "inherent 
and inalienable" broader and more powerful rights and protections than the Federal 
Constitution, and allows Utahan's to scrutinize and correct over-stepping government 
officials. Even judicial rules like res judicata must give way unless applied in the 
narrowest and strictest sense to prevent the government from raising barriers and 
silencing criticism. 
5. Equal protection requires llisil nr.ii i inl JIIII miiiiai i inl rouplos have 
equal rights This Court should make it clear to the legislature that rights of those who 
marry cannot be burdened more than parents who have children out of wedlock. Equal 
protection demands that they have equal rights. If this State wants to strengthen 
families and increase the marriage rate, then it must not give more liberty and freedom 
to cohabiting parents who break up than it does to parents who divorce. If judges were 
also given absolute power over cohabiting parents and their children, many of those 
parents would choose to marry and the result would probably be to substantially raise the 
marriage rate. 
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VI 
ARGUMENT 
Issue A: Parents must litigate (see P. 1) 
[Judge Medley failed to address this issue] 
Utah divorce laws, which give unlimited power and discretion to the court, fail 
to fully protect federal constitutional right of fit parents to make decisions regarding 
their children. Much of the resulting litigation expense is unnecessarily incurred by 
parents who seek to preserve their parental rights. Usual court procedures often prevent 
non-adversarial settlement in multitude ways [R.126 & 127] despite the best efforts of 
the parents. Court proceedings often cause adversity and as a result the courts make 
decisions that should be made by parents.[R. 134]. The courts regularly refuse to 
enforce Title 30 conciliation statutes that are specifically intended to promote 
reconciliation. [R.126,129]. 
Some lawyers seem to manipulate Title 30 to cause unnecessary litigation to 
increase their fees [R.66 & 67] in many ways that is beyond the ability of the parents to 
prevent. It will probably be necessary to make drastic changes in Utah Divorce Laws 
to accomplish a realistic, permanent solution which will protect Utah parent's federal 
rights [Tr. 13-14 - July 30, 2001; Tr. 16-20 - October 15, 2001] and genuinely work 
toward preserving marriages. 
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The Utah Constitution provides even more protection for parents to defend their 
parental liberties than does the Federal Due Process clauses. Article I Section One of 
the Utah Constitution declares "inherent and inalienable" parents' right to "defend 
their....liberties/' and the federal supremacy clause in Section Three makes parents 
federal constitutional rights as parents "supreme" to Utah's Title 30 divorce law. 
The United States Supreme Court took the unusual step in Troxel to condemn 
litigation as a burden on the federal parent-child relationship. [R. 122,185]. Although 
normal Supreme Court procedure is to remand to the state courts with instructions to 
reconsider the case "not inconsistent" with their decision, this U.S. Supreme Court 
decision bucks tradition, refuses to remand, and makes the important point that any 
litigation burdens federal parental rights. 
The Utah Court of Appeals, to follow federal mandate, must act now to see that 
Utah Law changes so as to minimize parental litigation. The Utah Divorce Code 
presumes litigation if there are any disagreements. If the court follows Troxel, it must 
instead presume it is in the child's best interest to give weight to reasonable decisions 
of fit parents. 
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Issue B: Validity of Title 30 (See P. 1) 
[Judge Medley failed to address this issue] 
In his argument to the District Court [R. 85-89] Dan lists (37) Utah divorce 
statutes which the Court of Appeals reviews under its abuse of discretion standard and 
which do not require the trial court to consider or preserve the parents' federally 
protected parental constitutional rights. In vivid hi-lighted detail [at R. 167-185] Dan 
demonstrates the Trial Court's overwhelming imbalance of power over the children as 
between the judge and the parents under Utah law. Throughout the record and 
transcripts [R. 131-132], Shinkoskey and Englert are utilized as support for and are stark 
examples of appellate interpretation of Utah's over-broad divorce laws that strip parents 
oiTroxel's federal constitutional right to raise their children without state interference. 
[See Troxel headnotes quoted in R. 172-185] 
Utah divorce statutes, as construed by Utah Case Law and the appellate courts 
failure to apply a Troxel strict-scrutiny standard of review, combine to eliminate any 
meaningful recognition by Utah Courts of the parents' federal constitutional right to be 
the decision-makers over issues regarding their children. Therefore, both as applied and 
on their face, Utah's divorce laws are repugnant to the federal constitutional rights of 
Joos' as fit parents and thefore are unconstitutional, void and unenforceable. [Troxel, 
supra, R.111-122]. [Also see also brief statute analysis R.105-108,149]. 
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Strikingly absent from the record is any attempt by the Utah Attorney General to 
defend the constitutionality of Title 30. Although notified and afforded the opportunity 
to do so [R.80-81], the State of Utah has done nothing to defend against Dan's 
constitutional challenge to Utah's divorce laws. The Utah Attorney General's silence 
speaks reams about the unconstitutionality of Utah's divorce laws. 
Issue C: Troxel Limits Powers of Divorce Judges (See P. 2) 
[Judge Medley does not believe that Troxel applies to him or to other divorce 
judges] 
Because this Court's decision in Joos v. Joos 11/4/99 [R.22, 23] lacks the 
required legal analysis, one can only speculate as to know why this Court stated, in 
effect, that all of Utah's divorce laws are constitutional. Conspicuously absent from this 
Court's 12/4/99 decision in Joos v. Joos is any citations or legal reasoning which even 
tends to support that conclusion. Troxel over-ruled the Utah Court of Appeals 11/4/99 
Joos v. Joos decision because the summary disposition fails to cite any contrary 
authority. 
Troxel makes it clear that parents are presumed to act in the best interest of their 
children. Only a casual review of the Utah Divorce Statutes quoted in the Addendum 
of this brief, shows a strong bias against the parents, in favor of a determination of the 
child's best interest b> i lir j tiilge. Over and over that is all that Utah's divorce law says. 
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Utah's divorce laws do not care or ask if the parents are fit. The law gives no weight to 
the decisions by fit parents. Both as written and as applied Utah's Divorce laws are 
repugnant to fit parents' federal constitutional rights as discussed in Troxel 
If we are to return to parents the right to raise their children, Shinkoskey and 
Englert are must be reversed. Only by reversal of this bad precedent can the proper 
balance of state power and people's rights be restored to their proper levels. 
The law plainly allows no parental input and gives no weight to their decision. 
For example, Utah law makes divorcing parents buy dental insurance. The law does not 
care if the family dentist is covered by a plan, if a parent or relative is a dentist, or even 
if the children need braces or food more than the insurance. Troxel restricts the Court's 
power to take such decisions away from fit parents, and should be declared by this Court 
to be void, unconstitutional and unenforceable. No other parents in the state are 
burdened like parents who divorce. Imposition of that burden on divorcing parents 
results in Utah's Divorce Laws violating the equal protection of state and federal 
constitutions. 
Issue D: Fathers are Equal Parents with equal rights (See P. 2 above) 
To raise the issue of gender bias is to walk on dangerous ground, but the Court 
of Appeals is powerless to act on this problem unless someone lays the issue before the 
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Court. Unfortunately the only way for this Court to make a determination of disparity 
of treatment between fathers and mothers receive is to show specific, individual acts of 
bias that, when taken together add up to a violation of the principles of fairness, equality 
and impartiality. By themselves, each can be argued away and dismissed. Added one 
upon the other, one must conclude that fathers are not treated equal to mothers and that 
Dan as a father has been denied his federal and state constructional rights to due process 
and equal protection and right as a fit parent to make proper decisions concerning his 
children without interference by the State of Utah. 
Although the complaint was drafted by an attorney, health problems caused the 
attorney to withdraw and Dan then proceededpro se. In his pleadings, Dan alleged that 
discrimination and bias against fathers exists generally in the Utah divorce courts. [R. 
128, 130 & 134]. Dan sincerely believes that at the hearing he suffered serious gender 
discrimination. Although the record is not as complete as it probably would have been 
if Dan had been represented by an attorney, Dan did his best to attempt to defend his 
parental rights as a father, as a pro se litigant. After considering his pro se status, time 
and subject matter limitations imposed upon him by the judge, etc., Dan did a reasonably 
good job of presenting his argument and demonstrating that Utah's divorce laws are 
unconstitutional on their face and as applied. 
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A few of the instances relied upon by Dan to demonstrate gender discrimination 
against him include the following: 
1. The hearing lasted less than one hour [Tr.44,Oct. 15, 2001], even though it 
was scheduled for one and one-half hours [R. 165]. Dan perceives gender bias to have 
resulted in unreasonable limitation on the time he was allowed to argue, even though 
ample time had been reserved to permit him to fully argue his case. 
2. Dan attempted to discuss the unconstitutionality of Utah's divorce laws. 
However, the judge discriminated against Dan by unreasonably limiting his time and the 
scope of matters he was allowed to discuss. 
3. Dan believes that, as an ongoing course of conduct by the trial courts, that the 
court unevenly applied procedural rules in favor of the mother and against the father. 
4. The Court failed to take corrective action to prevent opposing counsel from 
impugning Dan and his religious beliefs. Judge Medley's failure to take corrective 
action, violated Dan's First Amendment religious liberty and his due process and equal 
protection of Federal and State Constitutions. 
5. Before the hearing, Dan prepared posters and exhibits for use in connection 
with his argument. He submitted copies to the Court with his "summary of proposed 
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oral argument." [R. 167-185]. At the commencement of the hearing, when Dan ask to 
put up some posters, [Tr. 2, July 30, 2001] the Judge criticized Dan: [Tr. 3]. 
THE COURT: -so it's not necessary to start me at 
Kindergarten before you can bring me up to speed. I think 
I understand what the issues are, so you should focus on 
what the heart of your-of your positions are. 
Go ahead, Mr. Joos. 
6. Dan's introduction included a brief explanation of a few items from the 
universal declaration of human rights [Tr.4], basic freedoms, the Bill of Rights [Tr.5], 
parental rights under the liberty clause of the U. S. Constitution as defined in Troxel [Tr. 
6], denial of equal rights (discrimination) against Utah parents (fathers) in Title 30 [Tr. 
7], the unlimited power of judges over parents in Title 30. [Tr. 8-10], etc. 
7. Dan then attempted to discuss individual items listed in his Summary of Oral 
Argument [Tr. 11, R. 168-185], including such things as relevant Utah Statutes, the 
parents' lack of power to make decisions concerning their children, etc. the Judge 
interrupted and said: [Tr.12] 
THE COURT: Mr. Joos, I'm well aware of the-
MR.JOOS: Okay 
THE COURT: -discretion in that portion of the Code given to the trial 
court judges in the domestic relations context. 
8. Dan then tried to continue, but the judge again interrupted and said: [Tr. 14]. 
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THE COURT: Mr. Joos, sir, I'm going to have to limit your remarks— 
MR.JOOS: Okay 
THE COURT: -to five more minutes and I would like to hear something 
why you think res judicata does not apply.... 
9. Although only about ten minutes into a ninety minute hearing, the Judge 
didn't even allow Dan those "five more minutes." Instead of allowing Dan to present 
his argument as intended, the Court insisted that Dan address issues raised by the 
mother's attorney. The Court again interrupted Dan and said [Tr. 16]: 
THE COURT: But here's my point-
MR.JOOS: Okay 
THE COURT: -that I want you to address and then I'm going to have you 
sit down and-
MR. JOOS: Okay 
THE COURT: hear Mr. Fankhauser's position; 
10. Dan's perceived the Court's position as gender bias, in that among other 
things: 
A. The judge would not allow any discussion that challenges a judge's 
"power"; and 
B. That notwithstanding the declaratory judgment nature of the lawsuit, the 
purpose of the hearing was improperly limited to issues that mother's 
counsel wanted to raise. 
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11. As Dan perceived the rulings, after being treated like a witness instead of a 
litigant, after many interruptions and after being severely limited as to what he could 
argue, a striking transformation took place when the mother's attorney began to argue. 
See page after page of transcripts of argument by counsel for the mother without limits 
or interruptions from the judge. [Tr. 18-32]. 
12. When it is again Dan's turn to speak and the gender bias time limits and 
interruptions again appear. [Tr. 32]. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you Mr. Fankhauser. Mr. Joos, I'll give you 
a chance to respond. And Mr. Joos, I'm going to limit your reply 
response and hopefully this is not a problem, to ten minutes. (Emphasis 
added). 
[Tr. 38]. 
THE COURT: Mr. Joos, you have-you have two minutes if you want to-
(Emphasis added). 
MR. JOOS: Okay 
THE COURT: -make sure you get to your most important point— 
MR. JOOS: Sure. So-
THE COURT: -if you have not done so already. 
13. Later, when the mother's lawyer wanted to say more, his request to speak 
was granted by the judge. [Tr. 39]. Among other things, unlike the strict time and 
subject mater limitations imposed upon Dan, the Court allowed the mother's attorney to 
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wander from the issues and to talk about such things as an unrelated stipulation [Tr. 40, 
R. 193, 194, 201-205]. 
14. In spite of Dan's First Amendment right of religious freedom, the mother's 
attorney improperly disputed and ridiculed Dan's religion, yet the judge took no 
corrective action. [Tr. 40]. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: I dispute his claim that his religion forbids him 
from being an adversary to his wife in a divorce action.... (Emphasis 
added). 
15. Dan protests strongly this religious slight and the failure of the judge to 
defend his First Amendment rights. [R. 187-189,228]. Dan protests uneven application 
of rules by the Court, the silence imposed on him re issues for which the hearing was 
scheduled, while at the same time allowing the mother's attorney to speak freely on any 
subject. [R. 187-205,226-228]. The Judge took no corrective action. 
16. Dan perceived as the Judge's conduct of the hearing as gender bias. Among 
other things, the Court allowed the mother's attorney to disregard limitations on 
sanctions which may be imposed by URCP 11, which in relevant part reads as follows: 
[R.245]. 
2. The motion of Respondent requesting Rule 11 
sanctions be and the same is hereby granted. Respondent is 
awarded a judgment for attorney's fees and costs submitted 
by Affidavit, which attorney fees the Court deems to be 
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reasonable in the amount of $3,075,00, together with costs 
assessed at $29.80. Said judgment to bear interest at the 
judgment rate of 7.34% until paid in full. 
17. The judge granted monetary sanctions against Dan even though URCP 11 
expressly forbids imposition of sanctions in this case because Dan was represented by 
an attorney when the pleadings were drafted. URCP 11 reads in relevant part as follows: 
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a 
represented party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2). 
18. No one can dispute [R.9] that the complaint in this action was drafted and 
signed by Dan's attorney, that therefore URCP 11 prohibits imposition of sanctions upon 
Dan, or that in this action he was appropriately attempting to apply new law as 
specifically allowed by URCP 11. Dan believes that gender bias exists because those 
and other similar rules were disregarded or misapplied by the Judge to Dan's 
disadvantage. 
19. At the hearing Dan gave the judge additional evidence of gender bias [Tr. 
4-9,15-19 Oct. 15,2001]. The judge failed to even address the issue of gender bias. [R. 
261 & 262]. 
20. Another example of gender bias occurred when Dan's objection to the 
mother's attorney filing a fifteen page memorandum in opposition [R. 206-221] in 
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violation of the 10 page limit imposed by CJA Rule 4-501(l)(A) [R.226-228] was 
disregarded. Instead of granting Dan's objection to disregard of the page limit, the 
judge ignored the rule and adopted the content of the overlength memorandum as the 
Court's order by stated: [Tr. 45, October 15, 2001]. 
Additionally-in addition to those reasons, I'm going 
to adopt in full the analysis and authorities that are set forth 
in Mr. Fankhauser's memorandum in opposition and in 
support of the motion to strike and objection, which I am 
granting also. (Emphasis added). 
21. As Dan perceives gender bias in the Third District Court, mothers can do no 
wrong and fathers can do little right. 
Issue E: Declaratory Judgments (See P. 2) 
The Utah Supreme Court Held: (Kapetanov v. Small Claims Court ofOgden, 659 
P.2 1049 (Utah 1983) P. 1051: 
Declaratory judgments are those which declare the rights, status or 
other legal relations of the parties. They provide the means of resolving 
uncertainties and controversies before obligations are repudiated, rights 
are invaded or wrongs are committed. They are to be distinguished from 
other actions or proceedings in that the declaration stands by itself and 
does not involve executory or coercive relief. Also no actual wrong or 
loss need exist in order to sustain an action for declaratory judgment. 
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Previously the Court held: (Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119,120 
[1977]) 
The purpose of the creation of the declaratory judgment procedure 
was to avoid the difficulties of the common-law rule that rights would not 
be adjudicated by a court unless there had been a violation for which relief 
could be granted; and to provide a means for resolving uncertainties and 
controversies before trouble has developed or harm has occurred, and in 
order to avoid future litigation. 
Our statute provides that the Declaratory Judgment Act "....is to be 
liberally construed and administered" for the just stated purpose. In 
harmony therewith, the rule is that the court will be indulgent in 
entertaining actions brought to achieve that objective; and more 
particularly so, where there is a substantial public interest to be 
served by the settlement of such an issue. (Emphasis added). 
Shortly after Troxel, the Utah Court of Appeals, in Shinkoskey, failed to balance 
parent's rights with a divorce judges power. Appropriately, Dan immediately [R.1-30] 
filed action by declaratory judgment to prevent the litigation that ensues by failing to 
uphold parent's decision-making rights. 
Judge Medley failed its purpose and the parties' extensive constitutional rights 
[R.67-69] by dismissing this action by merely stating [R.240] that Troxel does not apply. 
This is nof'indulgent" as the Supreme Court stated in Kapetanov v. Small Claims Court 
ofOgden, 659 P.2 1049 (Utah 1983) P. 1051 [see above], nor does it conform to the 
statutes plain language. 
Troxel does apply. The Utah Court of Appeals has already applied it to Utah law 
[See P. 18-19 above]. Further, UCA§78-33-2 and UCA§78-33-12 require Judge 
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Medley's dismissal to be reversed and that he be required to apply Troxel and issue a 
well-reasoned judgment on that application. See Grand County v. Rogers, supra, at f 14, 
P. 737. In as much as Issue D above demonstrates bias against Dan, the Utah Court of 
Appeals must make certain that the dismissal of the declaratory judgment action is not 
also a product of bias. 
Issues F, G & H - Court Lacks Jurisdiction and is Barred by Federal and 
State Law From Granting Petition for Rule 11 Sanctions (P. 3 above). 
1. No Jurisdiction - Time to respond to motion not adhered. [R.41]. On 
March 26, 2001, Piper's attorney file a Notice To Appoint Counsel. Although Rule 4-
506(4), Rules of Judicial Administration, forbids the filing of any "proceedings....until 
20 days have elapsed," on April 12,2001 [R.49-53] Piper filed a motion under Rule 11 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for sanctions. Incredibly, that same day Piper filed 
a Reply To Petitioner's Response To Respondent's Motion For Rule 11 Sanctions. Dan 
had not even filed a response. Dan filed a timely Pro Se Notice Of Appearance on April 
16,2001 [R.58]. On April 26,2001 Dan filed his Pro Se Amended Response To Motion 
For Rule 11 Sanctions and Request for Oral Argument (Dan en-catptioned the pleading 
Amended to distinguish it from a letter Dan previously wrote to opposing counsel 
regarding sanctions) [R.59-70]. In the Response, Dan notified Judge Medley that 
because the documents were filed before the Notice Of Appearance, they were "barred 
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by the rule, void and a nullity." [R.60]. The Judge took no corrective action. The Reply 
filed before Dan's Response was allowed by the Judge along with an additional Reply 
filed May 3, 2001. [R.71-79]. Dan explained to the trial judge [R.189-190] that it is 
reversible error and bias not to treat the father fairly by requiring the mother's attorney 
to obey the rules of civil procedure. 
2. No Jurisdiction - Dan not properly served. As explained in detail in Issue 
D above, Dan's attorney, filed the declaratory judgment action. [R.9],[R.l-30] and then 
withdrew for health reasons. Piper's attorney requested the Court, in effect, to revise the 
rule and levy monetary sanctions against Dan. Piper's attorney never served Dan with 
his intention to seek monetary sanctions, and failed to provide him the safe harbor of 
Rule 11(c)(1)(A) URCP. The Court lacked jurisdiction to grant Rule 11 monetary 
sanctions because Dan was not provided the opportunity to withdraw the action. Rule 
11(c)(2)(A), URCP forbids the Court from awarding monetary sanctions when a 
"party"is represented by an attorney when the action is filed by his attorney. It is 
reversible error for the Judge impose sanctions. 
3. Sanctions Violate Federal and State Constitutions 
In the 48 Yale Review 524 (1959) Alpheus T. Mason states: 
The suggestion that any organ of government is beyond public 
scrutiny, more particularly that the judiciary should enjoy freedom 
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from critical examination greater than any other agency can claim, is 
to be deplored. Nothing of the sort was envisioned by the framers of the 
Constitution. Implicit in the system of government they established is 
the basic premise that unchecked power in any hands is intolerable. 
The freedom the judiciary has from political responsibility and control 
makes its processes more rather than less appropriate for critical 
exploration. (Emphasis added) 
Portions of the Declaration of Independence [P. 5 & 6 above] is a good indication 
why a petition for redress was so highly regarded and situated with the other precious 
of rights in the First Amendment. 
The colonies tried over and over to "petition for redress" to the king of Great 
Britain in defense of basic human rights until they had no other choice but to notify the 
government that "it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it." 
The Utah Court of Appeals held in Shinkoskey that the divorce judge has 
unlimited power over parents and their children. On the other hand, Federal Law as 
defined in Troxel holds that state judge's power is limited. 
What forum is available to divorce parents, other than a declaratory judgment 
action, to petition this Court to restore their rights and to limit and balance them with the 
district judges power? Since this Court provides no other forum for parents to seek to 
apply new law and to reverse precedents, allowing the District Court to issue sanctions 
is to violate the First Amendment. The Utah State Constitution is even more protective 
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of these rights. The Declaration of Rights, Section 1 of the Utah State Constitution state 
that they are inherent and inalienable and Section 2 specifically gives the people the 
"right to alter or reform their government...." A strict scrutiny review of Judge 
Medley's sanctions demonstrates a denial of due process of our Federal and State 
Constitutions. It is not narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. Like the king of 
England, its only purpose is to prevent reform and to silence criticism. 
Issue I - Res Judicata. 
1. Res Judicata does not apply. 
The United States Supreme Court in Troxel changed the law regarding parental 
rights protected by the United States Constitution. As a result, a Utah judge no longer 
has unlimited power to make decisions regarding parental rights. This decision affects 
the issues presented herein. Dan filed an appeal previously. Since that time Troxel was 
decided by the United States Supreme Court and changed the law. "A changed in law 
may allow a party to avoid the effect of issue preclusion." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co. V. Duel 324 U.S. 154, 162 (1945) cited in Collins v. Sandy City Board of 
Adjustment, 453 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 26 (Utah 08/02/2002). In essence then, when the 
law changes, Res Judicata no longer applies because the law upon which Res Judicata 
was based ceased to exist. 
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2. Court must apply Grand County vs. Rogers, 
In Grand County v. Rogers, supra, at ^ 14, P. 737, the Utah Supreme Court limited 
the power of the Utah Court of Appeals to render Memorandum Decisions, as follows: 
A memorandum decision may not be used to render a 
decision in any matter not clearly and unequivocally 
disposed of on the basis of well- established Utah case 
law or Utah statute. [FN3] A party to an appeal is 
entitled to an understanding of the reasons relied upon 
by the appellate court in reaching its decision. When the 
appellate court can cite to clear precedent that is, without 
question, applicable to the situation presented for review, 
the parties may know of the reasoning without the need of 
the appellate court reiterating previously well defined law. 
However, when the reasoning is new, or novel, or has not 
previously been applied to a matter of the type on 
appeal, a memorandum decision is inappropriate. 
(Emphasis added). FN 3 reads as follows: 
In the case of a statute, care should be used to ensure that 
first impression analysis of a statute, or unique 
application of a statute, be delivered in an opinion, not 
a memorandum decision. (Emphasis added) 
A published decision is required which addresses all issues raised. Because 
of the change in law which resulted from the U. S. Supreme Court's later decisions in 
Troxel supra. (June 2000) and Dodge v. Graville, 121 S.Ct. 2584 (June 2001), and 
because the Utah Appellate Courts have not considered the effect of those decisions with 
respect to the validity of the Utah Divorce Laws, as mandated in Grand County v. 
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Rogers, Supra, at f 14, P. 737, this Court is required to write a decision which gives Dan 
"an understanding of the reasons relied upon by the appellate court in reaching its 
decision." Dan's argument regarding the constitutional issues raised are "new or novel" 
and must be specifically ruled upon by this Court, with supporting reasoning, including 
reasoning as to why Utah's divorce laws do or do not violate the constitutional standards 
and presumptions expressed in Troxel, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, etc. 
VII 
CONCLUSION & RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons the Court should declare the provisions in the Joos v. 
Joos divorce decree in case #954904707, and the provisions in Utah Code Title 30 
concerning divorce, custody, etc. to be unconstitutional, void and unenforceable. 
Because of the potential social disruption and uncertainty, Dan recommends that except 
for its effect on the Joos v. Joos divorce decree in case #954904707, the Court consider 
delaying enforcement of this decision for a reasonable time to give the Courts and 
legislature a reasonable time to enact and fashion constitutional laws, rules, regulations, 
etc. and to permit an orderly change of procedure, similar to what the U. S. Supreme 
Court did when it delayed the effective date of its Ruling that the bankruptcy laws were 
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unconstitutional to give Congress an opportunity to enact a constitutional bankruptcy 
law. 
For the reasons stated above, this Court should also vacate and set aside the 
URCP 11 sanctions imposed against Dan, should award costs and attorney fees to Dan 
and such other relief as the Court deems proper in favor of Dan. 
Dated September 10, 2002. 
BARKER LAW OFFICE: 
By: \/ N-^M^u^C CL-
Ronald C. Barker 
VIII 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing to be served this 11th 
day of September, 2002, to the following person at the address indicated: 
E. H. Fankhauser, Esq. 
243 East 400 South, Suite #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
V C 
Ronald C. Barker 
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30-1-17.2. Action to determine validity of marriage -iTOrders relating to parties, 
property, and children — Legitimacy of children. 
(1) If the parties have accumulated any property or acquired any obligalions subsequent to 
the marriage, if there is a genuine need arising from an economic change of circumstances 
due to the marriage, or if there are children born or expectedjple courfhiay make 
temporary and final orders, and subsequently modify thdHntHh§| relating to the parties, their 
property and obligations, the children and their custody and parent-time, and the support 
and maintenance of the parties and children, as may be equitable. (Emphasis added) 
30-3-1(5). Procedure — Residence — Grounds. 
(d) In all actions th^jp&ft ai^HHBIhave jurisdiction over the payment of alimony, 
the distribution of property, and the custody and maintenance of minor children, as the 
courts and judges possess in other actions for divorce. (Emphasis added) 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of parties and children 
— Division of debts — Courtto have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and parent-time 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the courlt may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. YHir^fr t shall include 
the following in every decree of divorce: (Emphasis added) 
(a) an ordeir* assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical 
and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase 
and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent 
children; (Emphasis added) 
(2) The court may include, in £&1 ortieF determining child support, an*w#ef assigning 
financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If 
the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children 
would be adequately cared for, it may include an orden allowing the noncustodial parent to 
provide child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of 
the custodial parent. (Emphasis added) 
( 3 ) f l H B R t has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new|g[jb^; for the 
custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for 
distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and 
other members of the immediate familyrthiTco^ shall consider the best interest of the 
child. (Emphasis added) 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court <ff the need for peace officer enforcement, the 
court may include in an ordd' establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, 
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among other things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or 
visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court order 
is made and denied, IBecoifPshall ordef the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees 
expended by the prevailing party in that action, i ^ § ( ^ P P I e t ermines that the petition was 
without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a parent-tin^ order ly a parent, or a 
visitation order ly a grandparent or other member of the immediate family pursuant to 
Section 78-32-12«2jyhere a visitation or parent-time right has been previously granted by 
tHWWiTt, the dflWmay award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees 
and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to 
provide or exercise cfrurtnarderectJIsitation or parent-time. (Emphasis added) 
30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or divorce — Custody consideration. 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated, or their marriage is declared 
void or dissolved, thSilpjriishall make a3fW!K?Pfc>r the future care and custody of the minor 
children as it considers appropriate. 
(a) In determining custody, the court Shall consider the best interests of the child and the 
past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties. 
(b) The children may not be required by either party to testify unless the trier of fact 
determines that extenuating circumstances exist that would necessitate the testimony of the 
children be heard and there is no other reasonable method to present their testimony. 
(c) The court may inquire of the children and take into consideration the children's desires 
regarding future custody or parent-time schedules, but the expressed desires are not 
controlling and the coufrt may determine the children's custody or parent-time otherwise. 
The desires of a child 16 years of age or older shall be given added weight, but is not the 
single controlling factor. 
(d) Interviews with the children may be conducted by the judge in camera only with the 
prior consent of the parties. * 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other factors the court finds 
relevant, which parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the child, including 
allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the courtf 
finds appropriate. 
(3) If the couVt finds that one parent does not desire custody of the child, or has attempted 
to permanently relinquish custody to a third party, it shall take that evidence into 
consideration in determining whether to award custody to the other parent. 
(4) (a)ppBSmnay not discriminate against a parent due to a disability, as defined in 
Section 57-21-2, in awarding custody or determining whether a substantial change has 
occurred for the purpose of modifying an award of custody. 
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(b) I ^ f i j p i t takes a parent's disability into account in awarding custody or determining 
whether a substantial change has occurred for the purpose of modifying an award of custody, 
the parent with a disability may rebut any evidence, presumption, or inference arising 
therefrom by showing that: 
(i) the disability does not significantly or substantially inhibit the parent's ability to provide 
for the physical and emotional needs of the child at issue; or 
(ii) the parent with a disability has sufficient human, monetary, or other resources available 
to supplement the parent's ability to provide for the physical and emotional needs of the 
child at issue. 
(c) Nothing in this section may be construed to apply to: 
(i) abuse, neglect, or dependency proceedings under Title 62A, Chapter 4a, Child and 
Family Services, or Title 78, Chapter 3a, Juvenile Court Act of 1996; or 
(ii) adoption proceedings under Title 78, Chapter 30, Adoption. (Emphasis added) 
30-3-10.1. Joint legal custody defined. In this chapter, "joint legal custody": 
(1) means the sharing of the rights, privileges, duties, and powers of a parent by both 
parents, where specified; 
(2) may include an award of exclusive authority by the com:^  to one parent to make specific 
decisions; 
(3) does not affect the physical custody of the child except as specified in the orde# of joint 
legal custody; 
(4) is not based on awarding equal or nearly equal periods of physical custody of and access 
to the child to each of the parents, as the best interest of the child often requires that a 
primary physical residence for the child be designated; and 
(5) does not prohibit the couft from specifying one parent as the primairy caretaker and one 
home as the primary residence of the child. (Emphasis added) 
30-3-10.2. Joint legal or physical custody ordei — Factors for court determination — 
Public assistance. 
(1) The court may ordei|joint legal custody or joint physical custody or both if the parents 
have filed a parenting plan in accordance with Section 30-3-10.8 and it determines that joint 
legal custody or joint physical custody or both is in the best interest of the child. 
(2) In determining whether the best interest of a child will be served by ordering joint legal 
custody, the courtlshall consider the following factors: 
(a) whether the physical, psychological, and emotional needs and development of the child 
will benefit from joint legal custody; 
(b) the ability of the parents to give first priority to the welfare of the child and reach shared 
decisions in the child's best interest; 
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(c) whether each parent is capable of encouraging and accepting a positive relationship 
between the child and the other parent; 
(d) whether both parents participated in raising the child before the divorce; 
(e) the geographical proximity of the homes of the parents; 
(f) the preference of the child if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to 
form an intelligent preference as to joint legal custody; 
(g) the maturity of the parents and their willingness and ability to protect the child from 
conflict that may arise between the parents; and 
(h) any other factors tJgHptrt linds relevant. 
(3) The determination of the best interest of the child shall be by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
(4) f I f cour^shall inform both parties that: 
(a) an order €or joint legal custody may preclude eligibility for cash assistance provided 
underTme3 5A, Chapter 3, Employment Support Act; and 
(b) if cash assistance is required for the support of children of the parties at any time 
subsequent to anliraer of joint legal custody, the order may be terminated under Section 
30-3-10.4. 
(5) ^ e court may order that where possible the parties attempt to settle future disputes by 
a dispute resolution method before seeking enforcement or modification of the terms and 
conditions of the order of joint legal custody or joint physical custody through litigation, 
except in emergency situations requiring ex parte orders to protect the child. 
30-3-10.3, Terms of joint legal custod>|^eA 
(1) Unless flgte court Srders otherwise, before a final trdeitof joint legal custody is entered 
both parties shall attend the mandatory course for divorcing parents, as provided in Section 
30-3-11.3, and present a certificate of completion from the course to tffe i£Suf¥.l 
(2) Ai^ardenof joint legal custody shall provide terms ^f^BPbetermines appropriate, 
which may include specifying: 
(a) either the county of residence of the child, until altered by further ordefof the couiit or 
the custodian who has the sole legal right to determine the residence of the child; 
(b) that the parents shall exchange information concerning the health, education, and welfare 
of the child, and where possible, confer before making decisions concerning any of these areas; 
(c) the rights and duties of each parent regarding the child's present and future physical care, 
support, and education; 
(d) provisions to minimize disruption of the child's attendance at school and other activities, 
his daily routine, and his association with friends; and 
(e) as necessary, the remaining parental rights, privileges, duties, and powers to be exercised 
by the parents solely, concurrently, or jointly. 
(3)(Jfee courtishall, where possible, include in the ordenthe terms of the parenting plan 
provided in accordance with Section 30-3-10.8. 
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(4) Any parental rights not specifically addressed by thecgwr^rd^r may be exercised by 
the parent having physical custody of the child the majority ortne time. 
(5) (a) The appointment of joint legal custodians does not impair or limit the authority of the 
court to orBer^support of the child, including payments by one custodian to the other. 
(b) An order of joint legal custody, in itself, is not grounds for modifying a support order, 
(c) The agreement shall contain a dispute resolution procedure the parties agree to use before 
seeking enforcement or modification of the terms and conditions of the order of joint legal 
custody through litigation, except in emergency situations requiring ex parte orders to 
protect the child. (Emphasis added) 
30-3-10.4. Modification or termination of orderfl 
(1) On the motion of one or both of the joint legal custodians the count may, after a hearing, 
modify an order that established joint legal custody if: 
(a) the circumstances of the child or one or both custodians have materially and substantially 
changed since the entry of thagggggjto be modified, or the order h * become unworkable or 
inappropriate under existing circumstances; and 
(b) a modification of the terms and conditions of the decree would be am improvement for 
and in the best interest of the child. 
(2) The order qf joint legal custody shall be terminated by^rder of Iffe^ourtiif both 
parents file a motion for termination. At the time of entry of an order terminating joint legal 
custody, the court shall enter an order of sole legal custody under Section 30-3-10. All 
related issues, including parent-time and child support, shall also be determined and ordered 
by the court. | 
(3) If the court finds that an action under this section is filed or answered frivolously and in 
a manner designed to harass the other party, IBFCBWfl shall assess attorney's fees as costs 
against the offending party. (Emphasis added) 
30-3-11.2. Appointment of counsel for child. If, in any action before aSj^ourrof this 
state involving the custody or support of a child, it shall appear in the best interests of the 
child to have a separate exposition of the issues and personal representation for the child, 
ti^^ourjimay appoint counsel to represent the child throughout the action, and the 
attorneys fee for such representation may be taxed as a cost of the action. (Emphasis 
added) 
30-3-11.3. Mandatory educational course for divorcing parents — Purpose — 
Curriculum — Exceptions. (1) There is established a mandatory course for divorcing 
parents as a pilot program in the third and fourth judicial districts to be administered by the 
Administrative Office of t h e l N M from July 1, 1992, to June 30, 1994. On July 1, 1994, an 
approved course shall be implemented in all judicial districts. The mandatory course is 
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designed to educate and sensitize divorcing parties to their children's needs both during and 
after the divorce process. 
(2) The Judicial Council shall adopt rules to implement and administer this program. 
(3) As a prerequisite to receiving a divorce decree, both parties are required to attend a 
mandatory course on their children's needs after filing a complaint for divorce and 
receiving a docket number, unless waived under Section 30-3-4. If that requirement is 
waived|the coul*t may permit the divorce action to proceed. 
(4) The mandatory course shall instruct both parties about divorce and its impacts on: 
(a) their child or children; 
(b) their family relationship; and 
(c) their financial responsibilities for their child or children. 
(5) The Administrative Office of th^ppurts Shall administer the course pursuant to Title 63, 
Chapter 56, Utah Procurement Code, through private or public contracts and organize the 
program in each of Utah's judicial districts. The contracts shall provide for the recoupment 
of administrative expenses through the costs charged to individual parties, pursuant to 
Subsection (7). 
(6) A certificate of completion constitutes evidence tdytfae court of course completion by the 
parties. 
(7) (a) Each party shall pay the costs of the course to the independent contractor providing 
the course at the time and place of the course. A fee of $8 shall be collected, as part of the 
course fee paid by each participant, and deposited in the Children's Legal Defense Account, 
described in Section 63-63a-8. 
(b) Each party who is unable to pay the costs of the course may attend the course without 
payment upon a prima facie showing of impecuniosity as evidenced by an affidavit of 
impecuniosity filed in the"3!sf?SrcOTfi. In those situations, the independent contractor shall 
be reimbursed for its costs from the appropriation to the Administrative Office of the 
^BburtSifor "Mandatory Educational Course for Divorcing Parents Program." Before a 
decree of divorce may be entered, the courtfehall make a final review and determination of 
impecuniosity and may order the payment of the costs if so determined. 
(8) Appropnations from the General Fund to the Administrative Office of the Counts for the 
"Mandatory Educational Course for Divorcing Parents Program" shall be used to pay the 
costs of an indigent parent who makes a showing as provided in Subsection (7)(b). 
(9) The Administrative Office of the Court! shall adopt a program to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the mandatory educational course. Progress reports shall be provided 
annually to the Judiciary Interim Committee. (Emphasis added) 
30-3-15.3. Commissioners — Powers. 
Commissioners shall: 
(1) secure compliance with court orders; 
(2) require attendance at the mandatory course as provided in Section 30-3-11.3; 
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(3) serve as judge^pro tempore, master or referee on: 
(a) assignment of the court; and 
(b) with the written consent of the parties: 
(i) orders to show cause where no contempt is alleged; 
(ii) default divorces where the parties have had marriage counseling but there has been no reconciliation 
(iii) uncontested actions under the Uniform Act on Paternity; 
(iv) actions under the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act; and 
(v) actions under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act; and 
(4) represent the interest of children in divorce or annulment actions, and the parties in 
appropriate cases. (Emphasis added) 
30-3-32. Parent-time — Intent — Policy — Definitions. 
(1) It is the intent of the Legislature to promote parent-time at a level consistent with all 
parties' interests. 
(2) Absent a showing by a preponderance of evidence of real harm or substantiated potential 
harm to the child: 
(a) it is in the best interests of the child of divorcing, divorced, or adjudicated parents to 
have frequent, meaningful, and continuing access to each parent following separation or divorce; 
(b) each divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parent is entitled to and responsible for 
frequent, meaningful, and continuing access with his child consistent with the child's best 
interests; and 
(c) it is in the best interests of the child to have both parents actively involved in parenting 
the child. 
(3) For purposes of Sections 30-3-32 through 30-3-37: 
(a) "Child" means the child or children of divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parents. 
(b) "Christmas school vacation" means the time period beginning on the evening the child 
gets out of school for the Christmas or winter school break until the evening before the child 
returns to school, except for Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, and New Year's Day. 
(c) "Extended parent-time" means a period of parent-time other than a weekend, holiday as 
provided in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) and (2)(g), religious holidays as provided in 
Subsections 30-3-33(4) and (16), and "Christmas school vacation." (Emphasis added) 
30-3-33. Advisory guidelines. 
In addition to the parent-time schedules provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5, 
advisory guidelines are suggested to govern all parent-time arrangements between parents. 
These advisory guidelines include: 
(1) parent-time schedules mutually agreed upon by both parents are preferable to a court! 
imposed solution; 
(2) the parent-time schedule shall be utilized to maximize the continuity and stability of the 
child's life; 
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(3) special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the child available to attend 
family functions including funerals, weddings, family reunions, religious holidays, important 
ceremonies, and other significant events in the life of the child or in the life of either parent 
which may inadvertently conflict with the parent-time schedule; 
(4) the noncustodial parent shall pick up the child at the times specified and return the child 
at the times specified, and the child's regular school hours shall not be interrupted; 
(5) the custodial parent shall have the child ready for parent-time at the time he is to be 
picked up and shall be present at the custodial home or shall make reasonable alternate 
arrangements to receive the child at the time he is returned; 
(6)'BPiourt lmay make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably accommodate 
the work schedule of both parents and may increase the parent-time allowed to the 
noncustodial parent but shall not diminish the standardized parent-time provided in Sections 
30-3-35 and 30-3-35,5; 
(7)Tthe court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably accommodate 
the distance between the parties and the expense of exercising parent-time; 
(8) neither parent-time nor child support is to be withheld due to either parent's failure to 
comply with a court-ordered parent-time schedule; 
(9) the custodmlparent shall notify the noncustodial parent within 24 hours of receiving 
notice of all significant school, social, sports, and community functions in which the child is 
participating or being honored, and the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to attend and 
participate fully; 
(10) the noncustodial parent shall have access directly to all school reports including 
preschool and daycare reports and medical records and shall be notified immediately by the 
custodial parent in the event of a medical emergency; 
(11) each parent shall provide the other with his current address and telephone number 
within 24 hours of any change; 
(12) each parent shall permit and encourage liberal telephone contact during reasonable 
hours and uncensored mail privileges with the child; 
(13)parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than surrogate care and 
0^Bwfrt*shall encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if 
willing and able, to provide child care; 
(14) each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers with the name, current address, 
and telephone number of the other parent and shall provide the noncustodial parent with the 
name, current address, and telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the 
*courtftbr good cause orders otherwise; and 
(15) each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major religious holidays celebrated 
by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious holiday that the other parent does 
not celebrate shall have the right to be together with the child on the religious holiday. 
(Emphasis added) 
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30-3-34. Best interests — Rebuttable presumption. 
(1) If the parties are unable to agree on a parent-time schedule, ^ court fnay establish a 
parent-time schedule consistent with the best interests of the child. 
(2) The advisory guidelines as provided in Section 30-3-33 and the parent-time schedule as 
provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5 shall be presumed to be in the best interests of 
the child. The parent-time schedule shall be considered the minimum parent-time to which 
the noncustodial parent and the child shall be entitled unless a parent can establish otherwise 
by a preponderance of the evidence that more or less parent-time should be awarded based 
upon any of the following criteria: 
(a) parent-time would endanger the child's physical health or significantly impair the child's 
emotional development; 
(b) the distance between the residency of the child and the noncustodial parent; 
(c) a substantiated or unfounded allegation of child abuse has been made; 
(d) the lack of demonstrated parenting skills without safeguards to ensure the child's well-
being during parent-time; 
(e) the financial inability of the noncustodial parent to provide adequate food and shelter for 
the child during periods of parent-time; 
(f) the preference of the child if ^ | c o u r | determines the child to be of sufficient maturity; 
(g) the incarceration of the noncustodial parent in a county jail, secure youth corrections 
facility, or an adult corrections facility; 
(h) shared interests between the child and the noncustodial parent; 
(i) the involvement of the noncustodial parent in the school, community, religious, or other 
related activities of the child; 
(j) the availability of the noncustodial parent to care for the child when the custodial parent 
is unavailable to do so because of work or other circumstances; 
(k) a substantial and chronic pattern of missing, canceling, or denying regularly scheduled 
parent-time; 
(1) the minimal duration of and lack of significant bonding in the parents1 relationship prior 
to the conception of the child; 
(m) the parent-time schedule of siblings; 
(n) the lack of reasonable alternatives to the needs of a nursing child; and 
(o) any other criteria the court determines relevant to the best interests of the child. 
(3) The coirft shall enter the reasons underlying its order for parent-time that: 
(a) incorporates a parent-time schedule provided in Section 30-3-35 or 30-3-35.5; or 
(b) provides more or less parent-time than a parent-time schedule provided in Section 30-3-
35 or 30-3-35.5. 
(4) Once the parent-time schedule has been established, the parties may not alter the 
schedule except by mutual consent of the parties or a c4\kW *¥d51. (Emphasis added) 
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30-3-35, Minimum schedule for parent-time for children 5 to 18 years of age. 
(1) The parent-time schedule in this section applies to children 5 to 18 years of age. 
(2) If the parties do not agree to a parent-time schedule, the following schedule shall be 
considered the minimum parent-time to which the noncustodial parent and the child shall be 
entitled: 
(a) (i) one weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent or the coi^^rom 
5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m.; or 
(ii) at the election of the noncustodial parent, one weekday from the time the childfs school 
is regularly dismissed until 8:30 p.m., unless the courfcdirects the application of Subsection (2)(a)(i); 
(b) (i) alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree from 
6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year; or 
(ii) at the election of the noncustodial parent, from the time the child's school is regularly 
dismissed on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday, unless the court directs the application of 
Subsection (2)(b)(i); 
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend parent-time, and changes shall not be made 
to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend parent-time schedule; 
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncustodial parent shall be 
responsible for the child's attendance at school for that school day; 
(e) (i) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the total holiday period 
extends beyond that time so that the child is free from school and the parent is free from 
work, the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to this lengthier holiday period; or 
(ii) at the election of the noncustodial parent, parent-time over a scheduled holiday weekend 
may begin from the time the child's school is regularly dismissed at the beginning of the 
holiday weekend until 7 p.m. on the last day of the holiday weekend; 
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 
p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Martin Luther King, Jr. beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the 
holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely 
entitled; 
(iii) spring break or Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on the day school lets out for the 
holiday until 7 p.m. on the Sunday before school resumes; 
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday 
extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the 
holiday; and 
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-
32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday is 
equally divided; 
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(g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the following 
holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of 
the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Washington and Lincoln Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Monday 
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is 
completely entitled; 
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday 
extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(v) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A. weekend beginning at 6 
p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period 
of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until Sunday at 7 p.m; and 
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-
32(3)(b) plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 p.m., so long as the entire Christmas 
holiday is equally divided; 
(h) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive father every year beginning at 9 
a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(i) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother every year beginning at 9 
a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(j) extended parent-time with the noncustodial parent may be: 
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial parent; 
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial parent 
consistent with these guidelines; 
(k) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of uninterrupted time during 
the children's summer vacation from school for purposes of vacation; 
(1) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's extended parent-
time shall be 1/2 of the vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the custodial 
parent has holiday and phone visits; 
(m) notification of extended parent-time or vacation weeks with the child shall be provided 
at least 30 days in advance to the other parent; and 
(n) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable duration. 
(3) Any elections required to be made in accordance with this section by either parent 
concerning parent-time shall be made a part of the decree and made a part of the parent-time 
order. (Emphasis added) 
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30-3-35.5. Minimum schedule for parent-time for children under five years of age. 
(1) The parent-time schedule in this section applies to children under five years old. 
(2) If the parties do not agree to a parent-time schedule, the following schedule shall be 
considered the minimum parent-time to which the noncustodial parent and the child shall be 
entitled: 
(a) for children under five months of age: 
(i) six hours of parent-time per week to be specified b 4^KPSMMS>r the noncustodial parent 
preferably: 
(A) divided into three parent-time periods; and 
(B) in the custodial home, established child care setting, or other environment familiar to the 
child; and 
(ii) two hours on holidays and in the years specified in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) through (i) 
preferably in the custodial home, the established child care setting, or other environment 
familiar to the child; 
(b) for children five months of age or older, but younger than ten months of age: 
(i) nine hours of parent-time per week to be specified by the courier the noncustodial 
parent preferably: 
(A) divided into three parent-time periods; and 
(B) in the custodial home, established child care setting, or other environment familiar to the 
child; and 
(ii) two hours on the holidays and in the years specified in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) through 
(i) preferably in the custodial home, the established child care setting, or other environment 
familiar to the child; 
(c) for children ten months of age or older, but younger than 18 months of age: 
(i) one eight hour visit per week to be specified by the noncustodial parent ortSWffll 
(ii) one three hour visit per week to be specified by the noncustodial parent oj^ftHEg| 
(iii) eight hours on the holidays and in the years specified in Subsections 30-3-5(2)(f) 
through (i); and 
(iv) brief phone contact with the noncustodial parent at least two times per week; 
(d) for children 18 months of age or older, but younger than three years of age: 
(i) one weekday evening between 5:30 p.m. and 8:30 p.m. to be specified by the 
noncustodial parent or court; however, if the child is being cared for during the day outside 
his regular place of residence, the noncustodial parent may, with advance notice to the 
custodial parent, pick up the child from the caregiver at an earlier time and return him to the 
custodial parent by 8:30 p.m.; 
(ii) alternative weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree from 6 
p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year; 
(iii) parent-time on holidays as specified in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(c) through (i); 
(iv) extended parent-time may be: 
(A) two one-week periods, separated by at least four weeks, at the option of the noncustodial 
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parent; 
(B) one week shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; 
(C) the remaining week shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial parent consistent 
with these guidelines; and 
(D) the custodial parent shall have an identical one-week period of uninterrupted time for 
vacation; and 
(v) brief phone contact with the noncustodial parent at least two times per week; 
(e) for children three years of age or older, but younger than five years of age: 
(i) one weekday evening between 5:30 p.m. and 8:30 p.m. to be specified by the noncustodial 
parent or court^however, if the child is being cared for during the day outside his regular 
place of residence, the noncustodial parent may, with advance notice to the custodial parent, 
pick up the child from the caregiver at an earlier time and return him to the custodial parent 
by 8:30 p.m.; 
(ii) alternative weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree from 6 
p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year; 
(iii) parent-time on holidays as specified in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(c) through (i); 
(iv) extended parent-time with the noncustodial parent may be: 
(A) two two-week periods, separated by at least four weeks, at the option of the noncustodial 
parent; 
(B) one two-week period shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; 
(C) the remaining two-week period shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial parent 
consistent with these guidelines; and 
(D) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of uninterrupted time for 
vacation; and 
(v) brief phone contact with the noncustodial parent at least two times per week. 
(3) A parent shall notify the other parent at least 30 days in advance of extended parent-time 
or vacation weeks. 
(4) Telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable duration. (Emphasis 
added) 
30-3-37, Relocation. 
(1) When either parent decides to move from the state of Utah or 150 miles or more from the 
residence specified in the^gg^ldecree, that parent shall provide reasonable advance written 
notice of the intended relocation to the other parent. 
(2) The court tnay, upon motion of any party or upon the court's own motion, schedule a 
hearing with notice to review the parent-time schedule as provided in Section 30-3-35 and 
make appropriate ordefs^egarding the parent-time and costs for parent-time transportation. 
(3) In determining the parent-time schedule and allocating the transportation costs, the courti 
shall consider: 
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(a) the reason for the parent's relocation; 
(b) the additional costs or difficulty to both parents in exercising parent-time; 
(c) the economic resources of both parents; and 
(d) other factors ^ ttiecSSrPconsiders necessary and relevant. 
(4) Upon the motion of any party, *he court may oftfetjthe parent intending to move to pay 
the costs of transportation for: 
(a) at least one visit per year with the other parent; and 
(b) any number of additional visits as determined equitable by the court.1| 
(5) Unless otherwise ordered by tbeTccmrt, upon the relocation of one of the parties the 
following schedule shall be the minimum requirements for parent-time with a school-age 
child: 
(a) in years ending in an odd number, the child shall spend the following holidays with the 
noncustodial parent: 
(i) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday until Sunday; and 
(ii) the fall school break, if applicable, beginning the last day of school before the holiday 
until the day before school resumes; 
(b) in years ending in an even number, the child shall spend the following holidays with the 
noncustodial parent: 
(i) the entire winter school break period; and 
(ii) Spring break beginning the last day of school before the holiday until the day before 
school resumes; and 
(c) extended parent-time equal to 1/2 of the summer or off-track time for consecutive weeks. 
The week before school begins may not be counted as part of the summer period. 
(6) Upon the motion of any party, the courttnay order uninterrupted parent-time with the 
noncustodial parent for a minimum of 30 days during extended parent-time, unless the courtj 
finds it is not in the best interests of the child. If JHHPH**1 tfHHHt; uninterrupted parent-time 
during a period not covered by this section, it shall specify in its orde^ which parent is 
responsible for the child's travel expenses. 
(7) Unless otherwise ordered by the courtf he relocating party shall be responsible for all the 
child's travel expenses relating to Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and 1/2 of the child's travel 
expenses relating to Subsection (5)(c), provided the noncustodial party is current on all 
support obligations. If the noncustodial party has been found in contempt for not being 
current on all support obligations, he shall be responsible for all of the child's travel expenses 
under Subsection (5), unless the court hxles otherwise. Reimbursement by either responsible 
party to the other for the child's travel expenses shall be made within 30 days of receipt of 
documents detailing those expenses. 
(3|flPP Court*may apply this provision to any preexisting decree of divorce. 
(9) Any action under this section may be set for an expedited hearing. 
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30-5-2, Visitation rights of grandparents. 
(1) Grandparents have standing to bring an action in district|^yp|t)y petition, requesting 
visitation in accordance with the provisions and requirements of this section. Grandparents 
may also file a petition for visitation rights in a pending divorce proceeding or other 
proceeding involving custody and visitation issues. 
(2) There is a rebuttable presumption that a parent's decision with regard to grandparent 
visitation is in the grandchild's best interests. However, the court may override the parent's 
decision and grant the petitioner reasonable rights of visitation if the court finds that the 
petitioner has rebutted the presumption based upon factors which the court|considers to be 
relevant, such as whether: 
(a) the petitioner is a fit and proper person to have visitation with the grandchild; 
(b) visitation with the grandchild has been denied or unreasonably limited; 
(c) the parent is unfit or incompetent; 
(d) the petitioner has acted as the grandchild's custodian or caregiver, or otherwise has had a 
substantial relationship with the grandchild, and the loss or cessation of that relationship is 
likely to cause harm to the grandchild; 
(e) the petitioner's child, who is a parent of the grandchild, has died, or has become a 
noncustodial parent through divorce or legal separation; 
(f) the petitioner's child, who is a parent of the grandchild, has been missing for an extended 
period of time; or 
(g) visitation is in the best interest of the grandchild. 
(3) The adoption of a grandchild by the grandchild's stepparent does not diminish or alter 
visitation rights previously4||HWbUnder this section. 
(4) Subject to the provisions of Subsections (2) and (3), gy; court may inquire of the 
* grandchild and take into account the grandchild's desires regarding visitation. 
(5) On the petition of a grandparent or the legal custodian of a grandchild the court may, 
after a hearing, modify an order f egarding grandparent visitation if: 
(a) the circumstances of the grandchild, the grandparent, or the custodian have materially 
and substantially changed since the entry of the §g§0 to be modified, or the order, has 
become unworkable or inappropriate under existing circumstances; and 
(b) the court determines that a modification is appropriate based upon the factors set forth in 
Subsection (2). 
(6) Grandparents may petition the court^s provided in Section 78-32-12.2 to remedy a 
parent's wrongful noncompliance with a visitation*©*#efv 
78-45-7.15. Medical expenses. 
(1) The court shall ordei*that insurance for the medical expenses of the minor children be 
provided by a parent if it is available at a reasonable cost. 
(2) In determining which parent shall be ordered to maintain insurance for medical expenses, 
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tfoe court or administrative agency may consider the: 
(a) reasonableness of the cost; 
(b) availability of a group insurance policy; 
(c) coverage of the policy; and 
(d) preference of the custodial parent. 
(3) The order shall require each parent to share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the 
premium actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance. 
(4) The children's portion of the premium is a per capita share of the premium actually paid. 
The premium expense for the children shall be calculated by dividing the premium amount 
by the number of persons covered under the policy and multiplying the result by the number 
of children in the instant case. 
(5) The order shall require each parent to share equally all reasonable and necessary 
uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and copayments, incurred for the 
dependent children. 
(6) The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of coverage to the 
other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 
42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial enrollment of the dependent children, and 
thereafter on or before January 2 of each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other 
parent, or the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 
U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 
calendar days of the date he first knew or should have known of the change. 
(7) A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the cost and 
payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment. 
(8) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court*a parent incurring medical 
expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to recover the other 
parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with Subsections (6) and (7). 
78-45-7.21. Award of tax exemption for dependent children. (1) No presumption exists as 
to which parent should be awarded the right to claim a child or children as exemptions for 
federal and state income tax purposes. Unless the parties otherwise stipulate in writing, the 
court pr administrative agency shall award in any final order the exemption on a case-by-
case basis. 
(2) In awarding the exemption|J^ tourdbr administrative agency shall consider: 
(a) as the primary factor, the relative contribution of each parent to the cost of raising the 
child; and 
(b) among other factors, the relative tax bendlt to each parent. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), the courier administrative agency may not award any 
exemption to the noncustodial parent if that parent is not current in his child support 
obligation, in which case the courtpv administrative agency may award an exemption to the 
custodial parent. 
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(4) An exemption may not be awarded to a parent unless the award will result in a tax benefit 
to that parent. 
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